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Population ecology theory on interest group populations is examined to determine the implications 
for group membership levels in the states. Using the assumptions of the competitive exclusion prin-
ciple, it is hypothesized that relatively new interest groups should not directly compete for space, but 
should instead have a positive influence on each other's membership levels. A group's membership 
level should also be a function of space, energy, and political mobilization factors. Multiple regression 
analysis is applied to a fifty-state data set using the membership levels of five gay and lesbian interest 
groups as dependent variables. The hypotheses are confirmed—interest groups avoid direct compe-
tition for space by adapting into different issue niches. The results of these findings for a population 
ecology theory of interest groups are discussed along with directions for future research. 
SURVIVING AS AN O R G A N I Z E D I N T E R E S T 
In order to survive, an organization must effectively exploit the resources in 
its environment. Because many organizations are dependent on the same re-
sources as other, similar, organizations, they must find a way to share resources 
or eliminate other organizations through competition. In the case of interest 
groups working toward the same goal or collective good, however, competition 
seems illogical. How do interest groups resolve this conflict between self-
preservation and the achievement of a collective good? 
Lowery and Gray (1995) provide at least part of the answer in their analysis 
of interest groups at the aggregate level. They draw on biological concepts from 
population ecology theory to explain the number of groups within specific issue 
areas, but they do not use the theory to explain how or why membership levels in 
a group might vary across political jurisdictions. Because population ecology the-
ory outlines the nature of an ecosystem where groups within an issue area must 
struggle for resources and members to survive, the purpose here is to test the 
implications of the theory for the membership levels of interest groups within 
an issue area. I review population ecology theory and other literature addressing 
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group membership levels, develop hypotheses concerning competition, space, and 
energy, and test the hypotheses on the membership levels of five national gay 
and lesbian interest groups using a fifty-state data set. The findings and their 
implications are discussed in light of population ecology theory and research on 
interest groups more generally. 
The Population Ecology Theory of Interest Group Systems 
Lowery and Gray (1995, 5) invite us to consider the interest group population 
of a state as an ecological system where species live, reproduce, and die as they 
struggle for resources. They argue that the population ecology models employed 
in biology can be used to investigate such organizations as interest groups, be-
cause organizational populations are also constrained by their environments (see 
also Gray and Lowery 1996; Hannan and Carroll 1992; Hannan and Freeman 
1989). Competition is the main concept of population ecology theory, and the 
primary assumption of competition is that species, and members of species, at-
tempt to avoid competition by evolving into ecological niches. If these niches 
overlap, species will "partition access" to the overlapping resource so that each 
can survive. Biologists refer to this process as the competitive exclusion principle. 
Several important points stem from the assumptions of the competitive exclu-
sion principle. First, and compatible with interest group research, species avoid 
competition by developing an ecological niche (Lowery and Gray 1995, 9; see 
also Browne 1990; Gray and Lowery 1996). Second, individual groups within an 
issue area develop issue niches to avoid directly competing with each other in 
the same way species avoid competition with other species (Lowery and Gray 
1995, 10; see also Browne 1990; Gray and Lowery 1996). Eventually, however, 
issue niches may be limited by space, or the number of potential constituents; 
and groups will be forced to compete directly. Third, interest groups also need 
energy to survive. Lowery and Gray (1995, 11-12) define energy as the potential 
government goods or services that could be obtained by the group through lob-
bying efforts. Energy can stem from positive or negative forces but is best de-
scribed as "how active the government is now or potentially will be in the field 
impacting on . . . each type of group."1 
The concepts and assumptions of population ecology theory suggest that in-
terest groups within an issue area should strategically focus on narrow issues 
rather than general issues to avoid competition for members. If groups are work-
ing on similar issues in separate issue niches, their membership levels will be 
positively related for two reasons: first, the relationship between space (potential 
members) and the number of groups is positive, and second, groups will partition 
shared space, perhaps even to the extreme of sharing information and building 
In a similar manner, Brown (1989) argues that favorable public policy can help to mobilize potential 
constituents. 
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coalitions. If groups are not focusing on similar issues, space is less of a problem 
and membership levels will not be related. Furthermore, if space becomes lim-
ited, groups will begin to compete directly and their membership levels will be 
negatively related. 
If space is still abundant during the observation period, therefore, gay and 
lesbian group membership levels should be positively related. Few existing na-
tional gay and lesbian interest groups were formed more than fifteen years ago, 
and gay groups did not proliferate until the 1980s. Given this short time frame, 
lesbian and gay groups should have developed separate issue niches to avoid 
direct competition for space, but are unlikely to have maximized their space. 
Lesbian and gay interest group membership levels, therefore, should be positively 
related. 
Individual Level Factors 
Population ecology theory focuses on factors at the aggregate level even though 
individual level socioeconomic factors can influence a person's decision to join 
an interest group. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 31-32), for instance, argue that 
those of higher socioeconomic status will not only have more time and resources 
to participate politically, but their status also make them more likely targets for 
mobilization by groups (see also Leighley 1995). If socioeconomic factors such 
as income and education influence individual decision-making, one might also 
suspect that states with higher levels of income and education will have more 
persons involved with interest groups. In population ecology terms, an educated 
and wealthy population should make it easier for interest groups to use the 
"space" in which they live. 
VARIABLES: OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT 
Dependent Variables 
At the national level, the gay and lesbian interest group system is surprisingly 
diverse. Groups such as the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) 
and the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) are large and well funded, while groups 
such as Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (LLDEF), Gay and Lesbian 
Parents Coalition International (GLPCI), and the Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund 
(GLVF) are supported by relatively small membership rolls. In order to have a 
diverse collection of groups, I have selected groups that are composed mostly of 
gay and lesbian members, groups that focus on litigation (LLDEF, and HRC to 
some extent), groups that rely largely on lobbying and/or public education 
(NGLTF, GLPCI, and HRC), and groups that operate primarily as PACs 
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Independent Variables: I. Population Ecology Variables 
Competition. If the competitive exclusion principle is correct concerning inter-
est group behavior, competition between lesbian and gay groups for members 
should lead to a partitioning or sharing of resources. Subsequently, the mem-
bership levels of gay and lesbian groups should be positively related. Competition 
and the resulting partitioning of resources is measured as the summed member-
ship per 100,000 state population of the four lesbian and gay groups not being 
examined as the dependent variable in each model. For example, in the model 
explaining membership in the NGLTF, the summed membership of LLDEF, 
HRC, GLPCI, and GLVF is used as an independent variable. 
Space. Because space, the area in which interest groups live, is defined as a 
group's potential constituency, a measure of the gay and lesbian population is 
needed. While no simple measure exists, the 1990 census asked respondents if 
they lived with a partner to whom they were not married. The resulting data are 
separated by partnerships wherein both members are female and partnerships 
wherein both members are male. My measure of the lesbian and gay population, 
therefore, is the number of same-gender unmarried partner households per 
100,000 state population.4 Potential Constituency is expected to be positively 
related to membership levels in gay and lesbian interest groups. While this meas-
ure counts only those homosexuals in a relationship, living with a partner, and 
willing to admit it, the measure has clear face validity and is the best available 
measure of gay and lesbian population (see Haider-Markel and Meier n.d.; Wald, 
Button, and Rienzo 1996, 1170). 
Because state economic development and diversity influence the number of 
groups overall (Hunter, Wilson, and Brunk 1991; Lowery and Gray 1993, 1994), 
the economic development in a community of potential interest group constitu-
ents should influence the membership levels of interest groups. Greater economic 
development in the gay community should create a larger pool of individuals 
that have the time, resources, and the incentive to participate in collective action. 
The economic development of the lesbian and gay community is measured as 
2 The selection of groups was limited by data availability. Many groups I contacted, including The 
Log Cabin Federation, Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, ACT UP, Queer Nation, The 
Lesbian Avenger Civil Rights, Radical Fairies, Dignity USA, AIDS Action Council, Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders, and the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, would not or could 
not provide state membership figures. The groups providing figures, however, are generally repre-
sentative of the lesbian and gay interest group universe, 
1 Membership data were provided to the author by each interest group. 
4 Data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990, 195-200; see notes to Table 146 for a full 
definition). 
(GLVF). The membership level of each of these five groups is measured as the 
number of members per 100,000 state population,3 
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the summed number of gay businesses, bars, and newspapers per one million 
state population. 
Energy. The energy interest groups need to survive comes largely from the 
actual or potential benefits available to the group from government (Lowery and 
Gray 1995). To account for energy, therefore, we must measure government ac-
tion or potential action on gay and lesbian issues. Government activity on gay 
issues is examined by measuring the existence of antidiscrimination laws for gays 
and lesbians in the areas of public employment, public accommodations, private 
employment, education, housing, credit, and union practices. Each of the seven 
policies was measured by noting the jurisdiction covered (city, county, or state) 
and summing the population of each jurisdiction covered as a percentage of the 
total state population covered by the law (see Haider-Markel and Meier 1996).6 
To illustrate the measure, Alaska does not have a state law banning discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in public employment, but its largest city (Anchorage) 
does. Given the population of Alaska and Anchorage, 41.2 percent of Alaska's 
population is protected from sexual orientation discrimination in public 
employment. 
The percentage of the population covered by each law was summed to obtain 
one measure of state policy toward lesbians and gays, which is expected to be 
positively related to interest group membership levels. While favorable public 
policy may mobilize potential constituents as shown by Brown (1989) and Hansen 
(1985), group members are also a potential resource that interest groups can use 
to influence public policy (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996). I use the measure 
here simply to control for the effects of energy in the model and leave the causal 
order for future research. 
Another possible measure of energy is the salience of gay and lesbian issues. 
High issue salience may indicate both more government activity and more interest 
group activity. Furthermore, because salient issues increase citizen participation 
(see Hansen 1985, 83; Meier 1988, 30), it is logical to hypothesize that this 
participation may include joining interest groups. As the salience of gay and 
lesbian issues increases, I expect that membership in lesbian and gay interest 
groups will also increase. Issue salience is measured as the number of newspaper 
articles on gay and lesbian issues per 100,000 state population between 1985 and 
1993, as found on the Newsbank Electronic Information System.7 
5 This measure was created by counting the number of gay businesses, bars, and newspapers listed 
in the Damron Road Atlas (3d ed.) for each state. This list was supplemented by listings in Odysseus 
1992. Both are publications of the Damron Company and are the most comprehensive sources for 
contacts among gays and lesbians. 
6 City, county, and state laws are those listed by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (1993) 
and population data are from the U S . Bureau of the Census (1992). As of May 1993 there were 140 
laws nationwide. 
7 This system is an electronic index of major U.S. newspapers. It contains over 900,000 articles that 
can be referenced by key-words and listed by state. I used the key-words gay, lesbian, and homosexual. 
908 Donald P. Haider-Markel 
Independent Variables: II. Individual Level Factors 
Income and education have been shown to influence the individual decision to 
join an interest group (see Leighley 1995 for a summary). Because the relation-
ships are significant at the individual level, and individual decisions will influence 
the overall membership levels of groups, I hypothesize that higher income and 
education levels in a state will lead to higher membership levels in gay and lesbian 
• • • 8 • * 
interest groups (see Hansen 1985 for a similar argument). The high correlation 
between income and education levels forced me to standardize the measures by 
transforming each measure by its natural logarithm and then assigning each var-
iable a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The standardized measures 
were then summed to create a single measure.9 
STRATEGY OF ANALYSIS 
Membership in each of the five gay and lesbian groups is modeled separately, 
and standard regression diagnostics are used to test for collinearity problems and 
influential data points. 1 0 Because the results are compared across groups, the same 
variables are used in each model. Most of the variables used in this analysis are 
highly skewed, and preliminary analysis suggested that some of the relationships 
are nonlinear, leading me to transform each variable by its natural logarithmic 
function. Logging each of the variables allows the results to be interpreted as 
elasticities and should provide unbiased regression estimates (Tufte 1979). 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results for each model are shown in Table 1 and mostly support the 
hypotheses developed from population ecology theory. Each model predicts mem-
bership in the lesbian and gay groups fairly well, leaving little variance to explain 
in the dependent variables.11 The regression coefficients for each variable can be 
interpreted as the percent increase in a group's membership for a one percent 
increase in the independent variable, controlling for the other independent 
variables. 
Membership in the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF), Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund (LLDEF), and the Human Rights Campaign 
8 Education is measured as the percentage of the state's population that are college graduates, while 
income is measured as per capita income. Data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992). 
9 In my preliminary analysis, other factors were controlled for including urbanization, region, and 
political culture. None of these factors was significant, nor did any statistically improve the explanation 
level of the models. 
Regression diagnostics include studentized residuals, Hat Diagonal, and Cook's D. 
1 1 Regression diagnostics reveal that Hawaii and Mississippi are the most poorly predicted by the 
independent variables. Adding dummy variables for these states improves the overall fit of the models, 
but I can offer no theoretical reason as to why these states are so poorly predicted. 
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TABLE 1 
POPULATION ECOLOGY M O D E L S : D E T E R M I N A N T S OF MEMBERSHIP 
LEVELS IN GAY AND LESBIAN INTEREST G R O U P S 
N G L T F LLDEF HRC GLVF GLPCI 
Independent Variables Members Members Members Members Members 
Competitive exclusion 
Summed Membership 
of other groups .35** .35** .46* .08 
(.12) (.17) (.16) (.23) (.19) 
Space variables 
Potential Constituency 29** .40** .51** .54** .87** 
(.12) (.16) (.15) (.21) (.17) 
Summed Gay Institutions .96 - 5 . 4 0 11.37 35.11** - 3 6 . 3 3 * * 
(8.30) (10.95) (9.56) (13.58) (11.38) 
Engery variables 
.05 Anti-discrimination Policy .08** .07* .07** .08* 
(02) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) 
Salience of Gay Issues - . 1 6 - . 0 8 .03 .18 - . 0 6 
(.12) (.16) (.14) (.21) (.17) 
Individual level variables 
Income/Education Index .75** .87** .10 - . 3 8 .33 
(.25) (.34) (.30) (-45) (.36) 
Intercept -11 .37** -14 .02** - 1 . 1 2 .89 - 7 . 8 8 * 
(2.84) (3.82) (3.42) (5.03) (4.05) 
/?-square .85 .80 .82 .74 .70 
Adjusted fl-square .83 .77 .79 .70 .66 
Standard error .10 .18 .14 .29 .19 
F Score 40.76 27.92 32.35 20.15 16.96 
Probability of F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
N = 50 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels **p < .05; *p < .10 
(HRC) is predicted best by the models, with at least 80 percent of the variation 
in membership explained. Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition International 
(GLPCI) membership is the most poorly predicted, perhaps because it focuses 
on issues that involve parents and are not necessarily related to homosexuality. 
Most importantly, membership in each group, except GLPCI, is positively 
associated with the Summed Membership of the other groups. This result lends 
support to the hypothesis that in accordance with the competitive exclusion prin-
ciple, gay and lesbian groups avoid direct competition by partitioning space 
(members) through their adaptation to different issue niches. The finding is con-
sistent with the implications of the population ecology theory suggested by 
Lowery and Gray (1995) and the findings of Gray and Lowery's (1996) test of 
niche theory. 
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The measure of competition's lack of significance in the model of membership 
in GLPCI indicates that GLPCFs issue niche is so distinct from those of the 
other gay and lesbian interest groups that it does not have to share space with 
the other groups, GLPCI may attract gays and lesbians who do not feel well 
represented by other groups; as one might imagine, parents, gay or not, probably 
have different concerns from those of nonparents. The finding may also suggest 
that the most highly specialized interest groups in an issue area are least likely 
to be subject to the competitive exclusion principle and will, therefore, have no 
need to share space with other groups. 
Same-gender partner households, the measure of Potential Constituency, is 
the most consistent significant predictor of membership in each group, indicating 
that space is an important factor in predicting interest group membership levels. 
The other measure of space, Summed Gay Institutions (gay community eco-
nomic development), does not perform nearly so well; the measure is only sig-
nificant in two of the models and indicates a negative relationship in one. While 
this may be the result of measurement error, it could also indicate that com-
munity economic development does not necessarily translate into political mo-
bilization. The measure, however, is strongly significant in the model predicting 
GLVF membership. Because GLVF operates as a PAC and the other groups do 
not, it makes intuitive sense that economic development would matter most for 
the group most directly concerned about financial contributions. 1 2 
One measure of energy, antidiscrimination policy, performs quite well and 
shows significant positive influences on the membership of each group except 
GLPCI. This is likely the result of GLPCFs highly specialized issue concerns— 
GLPCI members are more likely to be concerned about gay parenting issues that 
are not captured by my measure of lesbian and gay policy. The broader measure 
of energy, issue salience, did not perform well, failing standard significance tests. 
Lastly, the income and education index variable explains membership in N G L T F 
and L L D E F well but fails significance tests in the other models. Being the two 
oldest groups in the sample, N G L T F and LLDEF may have more experience 
in targeting potential members in states with higher income and education levels. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Population ecology theory suggests that the environmental constraints of space 
and energy will determine membership levels in interest groups. The competition 
exclusion principle indicates that interest groups in competition for space (mem-
bers) will share space by partitioning the issue area into separate issue niches. 
The results of the analysis described above support the implications of the 
competitive exclusion principle—gay and lesbian interest groups avoid direct 
1 2 The costs of membership in the GLVF are considerably higher than for the other groups. GLVF 
members make an annual contribution of $100 and also promise to donate at least another $200 
annually to specific candidates supported by the GLVF (data from GLVF). 
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competition for space by sharing available space through adaptation into separate 
issue niches. This process allows each group to ensure its own survival without 
threatening the survival of groups working toward similar collective goods. 1 3 
The research presented here clearly demonstrates the implications and use-
fulness of population ecology theory for research on interest groups at the ag-
gregate level. As Gray and Lowery (1996) suggest, the framework may even 
provide the much-needed bridge between interest group research at the individ-
ual and aggregate levels by accounting for the importance of environmental con-
straints. Future researchers can expand population ecology theory by considering 
the framework's implications for issue specialization over time, the role of large 
donors in this process, competition between groups lobbying at different levels 
of government, and how the process of issue specialization may influence the 
representativeness of interest groups. 
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